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PANEL I: SECRECY AND
THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM
William E. Hellerstein*.
Good morning. In 1914, Justice Brandeis wrote that "[s]unlight
is said to be the best of disinfectants; electric light the most
efficient policeman."' Implicit in this simple aphorism is that
openness is a foundational differentiating characteristic that serves
to distinguish a free society from one that is not. Indeed, we in
America have persistently and loudly proclaimed that ours is an
open society, one that compares favorably not only to totalitarian
regimes but also to others that are less open than ours.
The subject of this panel, "Secrecy in the Criminal Justice
System," will focus on the greatest source of tension in our
constitutional framework - that between openness and the occa-
sional necessity for secrecy as to proceedings in which personal
liberty is at stake. It is a tension that sorely tests our commitment
to basic constitutional principles. Our heritage has set itself
squarely against the Court of Star Chamber in ancient England.2
Yet the exigencies of our times continue to test our commitment to
openness. It is this delicate balance between openness and secrecy
* Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School.
Louis D. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE'S MONEY AND How THE BANKERS
USE IT 92 (1914).
2 See 1 SIR WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF
ENGLAND 347, 397 (William C. Jones ed., Claitor's Publ'g Div. 1976). The
Court of Star Chamber was authorized to "inquire into all offenses against the
government, and to commit offenders to safe custody." Id. at 347. This court of
law was the judicial branch of England's King's Council between 1485 and 1641
and is named after a star on the ceiling of a room in the old palace of Westmin-
ster. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1414 (7th ed. 1999). The court became
infamous for its abusive discretion. Pursuant to statute, the court was divested of
all criminal law jurisdiction. Thereafter, the court dealt mainly with land
disputes. Id.
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in the criminal justice system that our courts are asked to maintain
and that the public, we, are asked to appreciate.
Our panel's charge is to explore whether in attempting to
maintain that delicate balance we are succeeding or whether in fact
we are drifting away more than is necessary towards a universe
that is more closed than is appropriate and fair, and which perforce
threatens due process of law. The composition of our panel is more
than well situated to discuss the various tension points in the
criminal justice system that put at peril our commitment to
openness. To conserve time, I will not dwell on the credentials of
our four panelists. Their respective vitae are set forth in our
brochure and I am sure that if you have not already examined it,
you will.
Our first speaker will be the Honorable Michael B. Mukasey of
the United States District Court for the Southern District of New
York. He will give us the judicial perspective on the secrecy
conundra that affect high profile cases, especially those involving
international terrorism. One only has to be in the company of Judge
Mukasey at a conference or a retreat to appreciate what conse-
quences to his own private life his involvement in terrorist cases
have created. This involvement simply indicates the delicate nature
of the process that touches upon cases of such moment.
Our second speaker will be Mary Jo White, United States
Attorney for the Southern District of New York. As you will agree,
I am sure, her talents and professionalism have continued the great
traditions of her office. She, no less than Judge Mukasey, has been
at the center of the most serious international terrorist incidents of
our time. She will speak to us about secrecy from the perspective
of the prosecutor who must investigate these incidents, gather and
present evidence, and maintain continuing investigations on a
national and international level. Yet, she too must operate under
our presumptive system of openness. She will speak about the
manner in which she strives to maintain that delicate balance.
Our third speaker, Adam Liptak, is the Senior Counsel to The
New York Times Company. He will speak from the perspective of
someone who is on the outside looking in; that is, one whom secret
proceedings and sealing of public documents seek to exclude, in
the greater interest of national security and other similar interests.
In this regard, Mr. Liptak represents all of us and he works from
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the broad body of First Amendment jurisprudence that the Supreme
Court has given us with respect to press access. Nonetheless, as he
will tell you, we do not necessarily get what we see.
Our final speaker, Gerald L. Shargel, is one of the most
eminent defense attorneys of our time. As Dean Wexler noted, he
is a graduate of this Law School. He shares his wisdom and skills
with our students as an adjunct professor of Trial Advocacy.
Furthermore, he is one of those rare members of the defense bar
who is as skillful in the appellate court as he is in the trial court.
Mr. Shargel will focus on the day-to-day secrecy issues that
confront defense counsel in the more usual run of criminal cases.

Hon. Michael B. Mukasey*
Thank you. There is a kind of "gee whiz" aspect to discussions
of secrecy, particularly in connection with terrorism trials. I think
that ought to be mitigated a bit. The secrecy problems associated
with high profile cases generally, and terrorist cases in particular,
are just a subset of the secrecy problems that are associated with
trials generally. Initially, trials involve attempts to assure that
defendants receive a fair trial and the outcome of their trial is not
influenced by what jurors read or hear. The outcome is also
influenced by the fact that in virtually any trial, civil or criminal,
the court necessarily becomes the repository for the confidences of
the parties. This is true regardless of whom the parties call as
witnesses or whatever their attempts to subpoena documents before
trial are. Thus, we are operating in an area that is really common
to many cases and perhaps gets the most focus in high profile
cases. It is, however, something we deal with every day.
In criminal cases, parties frequently subpoena documents before
trial under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 17(c).' Those
proceedings are almost always held in camera and ex parte. One
side, for example, approaches the court for authorization to obtain
documents from the opposing side for use at trial. The other side
does not know about this release of information because adversar-
ies are reluctant to reveal any possible advantages. Thus, the pro-
United States District Court Judge, Southern District of New York.
FED. R. CRIM. P. 17(c). Rule 17(c) provides:
A subpoena may also command the person to whom it is directed to
produce the books, papers, documents or other objects designated
therein. The court on motion made promptly may quash or modify the
subpoena if compliance would be unreasonable or oppressive. The
court may direct that books, papers, documents or objects designated
in the subpoena be produced before the court at a time prior to the trial
or prior to the time when they are to be offered in evidence and may
upon their production permit the books, papers, documents or objects
or portions thereof to be inspected by the parties and their attorneys.
Id.
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ceeding continues almost entirely in secret. Eventually, of course,
evidence that is subpoenaed becomes public because it is presented
at trial. If litigation on these issues is a possibility, it is unclear
whether that will be public.
The first problem encountered in a high profile case involves
the selection of an anonymous jury. This process becomes
necessary in high profile cases to protect the security of jurors. The
confidential information in that case, mercifully, is something that
even the court, and in a sense, the judge, is unaware of. The clerk
knows the names of the jurors; the judge and the parties do not.
The court tries at all costs to keep that information secret.
In United States v. Rahman, a terrorism case I tried,2 the
identities of at least two of the jurors became known to some
reporters after the case was over. As a result, those reporters
camped outside the jurors' doors to discuss the jury's deliberations.
My principal involvement with secrecy in connection with the
Rahman case involved a statute called the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act, commonly known as FISA.3 Fortunately, it is
probably one of the least known statutes on the books. The statute
creates a FISA court that is comprised of seven judges from seven
separate circuits around the country who convene in order to hear
applications for government surveillance of foreign intelligence
activities.4 These activities can include terrorist activities that could
2 United States v. Rahman, 861 F. Supp. 247 (S.D.N.Y. 1994), aff'd, 189
F.3d 88 (2d Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 830 (2000); see also Joseph P.
Fried, Sheik Sentenced to Life in Prison in Bombing Plot, N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 18,
1996, at Al (reporting that Abdel Rahman and nine others planned a "day of
terror" on which five bombs were to blow up the United Nations Building, the
Lincoln and Holland Tunnels, the George Washington Bridge, and the main
federal office building in Manhattan).
' 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1811 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
4 Id. § 1803(a). Section 1803(a) announces that seven district court judges
appointed by the Chief Justice of the United States "shall constitute a court
which shall have jurisdiction to hear applications for and grant orders approving
electronic surveillance anywhere within the United States." Id. Where a judge
denies any such application, such judge must promptly elucidate in writing his
or her reasons for doing so. Id. Such writing "shall be transmitted, under seal,
to the court of review." Id. The reviewing court consists of three judges from the
district courts and courts of appeals as appointed by the Chief Justice of the
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have an impact on United States citizens or resident aliens. If
warrants are granted, an appeal can be taken to an ad hoc appellate
court, comprised, I am happy to say, of three other judges from
three other circuits. 5
The information that is obtained in that kind of surveillance is
only for the purpose of conducting foreign intelligence and
protecting the security of the United States. That kind of intelli-
gence, however, can involve criminal activity, and when that
criminal activity is subsequently prosecuted, the government has
the opportunity to disclose what it has detected and the ability to
use some of it in court. That process should permit defendants to
challenge the validity of the surveillance itself. Defendants have a
difficult time challenging such evidence because they do not have
access to either the application or the supporting material. Thus the
defendant reluctantly relies principally on the court to conduct an
examination of the underlying documentation in order to assure that
there was probable cause to believe that the proposed surveillance
would yield appropriate information and that certifications were
obtained.
The court is permitted under FISA to let defendants see some
or all of the application to help them make their arguments.6 I did
not, however, find that necessary and I am unaware of any other
court that has. It bears emphasis that the statute does not indicate
whether the information discovered from surveillance is admissible
at trial. As a result, I believe the matter is principally covered by
the traditional rules of evidence. Nor does the statute mention how
evidence that is beneficial to the defendants should be considered
by the court. Thus the judge is in an anomalous position. The judge
United States. Id. § 1803(b).
' Id. § 1803(b). If the reviewing court deems the application properly denied,
then it, too, shall enumerate in writing its reasons therefor. Id. Upon any
successful petition for certiorari, "the record shall be transmitted under seal to
the Supreme Court, which shall have jurisdiction to review such decision." Id.
6 Id. § 1806(f). "[T]he court may disclose to the aggrieved person, under
appropriate security procedures and protective orders, portions of the application,
order, or other materials relating to the surveillance only where such disclosure
is neccessary to make an accurate determination of the legality of surveillance."
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is forced not only to act as an arm of the prosecution in weighing
the prosecution's arguments about whether disclosure would or
would not compromise national security, but also to act as a
defense lawyer in determining whether the information is useful to
the defendant. This is certainly a difficult task, particularly before
trial, and it must be accomplished in a continuous fashion during
the trial to assure that no vital evidence is overlooked. Although it
is a rough and ready way to balance the paradox facing the judicial
system, the alternative is either to have no surveillance at all or to
have totally uncontrolled surveillance. Thus, the existing system is
a compromise that Congress was forced to make.
There is another statute involving protection of classified
information: the Classified Information Procedures Act ("CIPA"),7
which can be applied at trial. When a party proposes that classified
information be disclosed in the course of a trial, the government is
permitted to go into court and try to either prevent the disclosure
7 18 U.S.C. app. §§ 1-16 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998). CIPA allows any party
post-indictment to seek a conference in order to evaluate potential issues that
may arise during the course of a prosecution relating to classified information.
Id. § 2. A district court is required to issue a protective order preventing a
defendant from examining any classified information upon motion by the United
States. Id. § 3. As a result, a defendant may only seek access to redacted
materials or summaries of information prepared by the United States. Id. § 4.
The court, moreover, may examine any classified documents in camera upon
request by the United States. Id. If the information is kept confidential, it shall
be held under seal and made available only to an appellate court. Id.
In the event that a defendant "reasonably expects to disclose.. . classified
information," he must notify the United States and supply a brief synopsis of
such evidence. Id. § 5. Interlocutory appeals are generally permitted. For
example, any appeal pursuant to a CIPA disposition "shall be expedited by the
court of appeals." Id. § 7. In the event of an appeal during a trial, the trial court
must adjourn its proceedings until the appeal is decided by the court of appeals.
Id.
Where classified information is to be introduced as evidence, the district
court must take appropriate precautions. Id. § 8. Such precautions include
providing the court with proffers of a witness' response to a line of inquiry or
question. Id. § 8(c). A court, moreover, may only allow portions of writings,
photographs, or recordings into evidence. Id. § 8(b). Furthermore, the trial court
must implement certain security procedures to guard against the disclosure of any
classified information. Id. § 9.
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of that secret information, or at least restrict the disclosure to
summaries or to sanitized versions so as not to compromise
national security. The ultimate price the government could pay for
blocking disclosure is dismissal of an indictment. That is rare,
however.
As I stated before, CIPA was applicable only to a limited extent
in the terrorism case I presided over. In that case, there was no
concealment relating to the filing of charging instruments. There
was at least one confidential proceeding relating to a witness in
which the witness' safety was threatened.8 This proceeding went
up to the court of appeals. 9 To my knowledge, none of the four
judicial officers involved in that proceeding ever suggested that it
be open. If the proceeding had been opened, it would have been at
a risk to the witness' life. Thus, that was the only completely
closed matter in that case, other than the identity of the jurors,
which remained closed due to the restraint of the press.
8 Rahman, 861 F. Supp. at 251 (rejecting a FISA disclosure challenge and
ruling that "the motions will be decided with the submitted material in camera").
For an interesting application of CIPA, see United States v. Wilson, 750 F.2d 7
(2d Cir. 1996). In Wilson, the defendant was indicted by a Grand Jury for
shipping explosives to Libya and for witness tampering, among many other
charges. Id. at 8. Defendant insisted upon the opportunity to testify in detail
about classified counterintelligence activities he allegedly undertook on behalf of
the United States. Id. An in camera hearing was held to examine the proffered
evidence. Relying upon both section five of CIPA and Rule 403 of the Federal
Rules of Evidence, the district court refused to allow defendant to testify as to
such matters. Id. at 9. The Second Circuit found no constitutional transgression.
9 United States v. Rahman, 189 F.3d 88 (2d Cir. 1999).

Mary Jo White*
I have been assigned to act in a role today which is easy, and
I will speak about my perspective, a prosecutor's perspective, of
the importance of secrecy, particularly in terrorism trials and inves-
tigations.
I will begin with what is really obvious: from a prosecutor's
point of view, it is hard to imagine a category of criminal cases of
greater gravity than those involving international terrorism. Crimes
of international terrorism often involve the mass murder or plots of
mass murder of hundreds of innocent citizens. We are all familiar
with the bombing of the World Trade Center on February 26,
1993.' Since that jarring crime, the Federal Bureau of Investiga-
tion, the New York Police Department, the Joint Terrorist Task
Force in New York,2 the Southern District of New York's United
States Attorney's Office, and the courts of the Second Circuit have
been continuously and actively involved in investigations, prosecu-
tions, trials and appeals of allegations, events and cases involving
international terrorism.
Because I believe it is worth the time, I would like to discuss
very briefly the related cases that followed the World Trade Center
case. In addition to the World Trade Center bombing itself, there
was the so-called "Day of Terror Plot" that Judge Mukasey
presided over.3 In this terrorism plot, at least a dozen terrorists
planned in 1993 to blow up the Lincoln and Holland Tunnels, the
George Washington Bridge, the United Nations, and 26 Federal
United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York.
George J. Church, The Terror Within, TIME, July 5, 1993, at 22; see also
Richard Lacayo, Tower Terror, TIME, Mar. 8, 1993, at 24 (recounting the World
Trade Center bombing events).
2 Benjamin Weiser, Appellate Court Backs Conviction in '93 Terror Plot,
N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 17, 1999, at Al. The Joint Task Force is an organization
comprised of the New York City Police Department and the Federal Bureau of
Investigation charged with investigating terrorist activities and apprehending
those who commit and plot to commit terrorist acts. Id.
' United States v. Rahman, 861 F. Supp. 247 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).
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Plaza, which houses the New York FBI office.4 In another
terrorism case, Ramzi Ahmed Youssef, one of the alleged master-
minds of the World Trade Center bombing, plotted in 1994-95,
while he was a fugitive, to destroy a dozen American jumbo jets
flying back from the Far East in a single forty-eight hour period.5
The most recent pending terrorist case deals with the bombings of
our embassies in East Africa in August 1998.6 More than two
hundred twenty totally innocent African and American citizens
were killed in those two, nearly simultaneous bombings.7
In other western nations, more permissive rules apply to those
accused of terrorist crimes.8 In the United States, we have all of
the safeguards of the Constitution, the rules of criminal procedure,
and the rules of evidence, which are fully applicable to defendants
accused of terrorist crimes who are tried in American courtrooms.
I believe that the United States' judicial system is a model of how
terrorist crimes should be prosecuted. We should not lower the bar
4 See generally Joseph P. Fried, Prosecution Rests Case in a Trial on
Terrorism, N.Y. TIMES, June 29, 1995, at B2; Weiser, supra note 2, at Al.
' See generally Tom Carter, FBI Unit to Probe Pakistan Shooting; 2
Americans Slain in Attack on Van, WASH. TIMES, Mar. 9, 1995, at A17; Mark
Mathews & Tom Bowman, Terror Strikes the Heartland, BALT. SUN, Apr. 20,
1995, at 16A.
6 See generally James Risen, After the Attack: The Overview; Blast Suspect
Held in U.S. and Is Said to Admit Role, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 28, 1998, at Al.
7 Id.
8 See Gregory C. Clark, Note, History Repeating Itself: The (D)evolution of
Recent British and American Antiterrorist Legislation, 27 FORDHAM URB. L.J.
247, 254 (1999) (comparing the approaches of American and British legislation
to combat terrorism and noting that British law gives authorization to detain
terrorist suspects for questioning without trial). A suspect can be detained "for
an initial period of forty-eight hours, which can then be extended to an additional
five days ... all without formal charges or an appearance before a magistrate."
Id. at 254-55. See also Jacqueline Ann Carberry, Comment, Terrorism: A Global
Phenomenon Mandating a Unified International Response, 6 IND. J. GLOBAL
LEGAL STUD. 685, 688 (1999) (contrasting American and British legislation and
noting that the European Court of Human Rights has expressed that allowing
individuals to be detained for potentially long periods without a court appearance
violates the European Convention on Human Rights); Venkat Iyer, States of
Emergency - Moderating Their Effects on Human Rights, 22 DALHOUSIE L.J.
125, 139 (1999) (discussing the British government's view that long detentions
prior to judicial review are necessary to successfully investigate terrorist crimes).
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of our criminal justice system when it is invoked to deal with the
very serious crimes of terrorism. If we did lower the bar, we would
be bowing to that particular type of crime and diluting our own
fundamental principles of fairness and due process.
Instead, the Constitution is the basis for our entire criminal
justice system. The Constitution guarantees several safeguards to
protect the accused from unfair judicial proceedings. One of the
most fundamental safeguards of our criminal justice system is the
presumptive right accorded by the First Amendment to public
access to criminal proceedings once charges are filed.9 The Sixth
Amendment provides an additional safeguard to a defendant.1" It
guarantees the accused the right to a public trial in which the
government must prove its case. Finally, prior to indictment,
12
the accused as well as witnesses benefit from another fundamental
9 U.S. CONST. amend. I. In relevant part, the First Amendment commands
that "Congress shall make no law... abridging the freedom.., of the press."
Id. See Press-Enterprise v. Superior Court, 478 U.S. 1, 12 (1986) (observing that
"public access to criminal trials and the selection of jurors is essential to the
proper functioning of the criminal justice system") [hereinafter Press-Enterprise
II]; Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 48 (1984) (holding that the closure of an
entire suppression hearing lasting seven days was unjustified in light of the scant
privacy interests advanced by the state); Press-Enterprise v. Superior Court, 464
U.S. 501, 510 (1984) (stating that "[t]he presumption of openness may be
overcome only by an overriding interest based on findings that closure is
essential to preserve higher values and is narrowly tailored to serve that interest")
[hereinafter Press-Enterprise I].
'o U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
" The Sixth Amendment provides:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a
speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district
wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall have
been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature
and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses
against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his
favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.
Id.
12 The Fifth Amendment affords defendants another safeguard: it requires
that "[n]o person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous
crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury." U.S. CONST.
amend. V.
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safeguard: the requirement that grand jury proceedings be held in
secret. 13
In international terrorism cases, certainly the ones I have been
involved in, these opposing safeguards of openness and secrecy
most often operate simultaneously. Even after public criminal
proceedings are commenced, extensive and rapidly moving secret
grand jury investigations of additional charges and additional
potential defendants actively continue, very often long after
indictment and even after the first series of criminal trials is
completed. Thus, secrecy is essential to preserving the integrity of
ongoing terrorism investigations and the safety of those providing
information to the grand jury and the government.
As a result, you can and should expect prosecutors to zealously
safeguard the secrecy that protects those very compelling interests.
The First Amendment allows that secrecy to occur. There is, of
course, no First Amendment right of access to grand jury proceed-
ings. Even after the First Amendment comes into play, when some
charges are filed, access and openness are qualified rights.14 These
rights may be compromised when the defendant's Sixth Amend-
ment right to a fair trial is judged paramount.15 They may also be
compromised by a compelling government interest in preserving
grand jury secrecy, the integrity of ongoing investigations,
confidential intelligence-gathering activities, or the safety of
witnesses, defendants, and their families.
Government lawyers, in addition to being bound by the dictates
of the First Amendment, are also bound by regulation to safeguard
13 FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(2). Rule 6(e)(2), in relevant part, requires that a
person "shall not.., disclose matters occurring before the grand jury." Id. See
also Barnett v. Dillon, 890 F. Supp. 83, 88 (N.D.N.Y. 1995) (stating that federal
grand jury proceedings are to be kept secret absent a "showing of particularized
need").
14 See Press-Enterprise II, 478 U.S. at 15 (stating that "[i]f the particular
proceeding in question passes these tests of experience and logic, a qualified
First Amendment right of public access attaches," but "even when a right of
access attaches, it is not absolute") (citation omitted); Press-Enterprise I, 464
U.S. at 509 (noting that "[c]losed proceedings, although not absolutely precluded,
must be rare and only for cause shown that outweighs the value of openness")
(footnote omitted).
15 U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
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the vital public interest in the openness of judicial proceedings. 6
But in international terrorism cases, prosecutors are extremely
solicitous and protective of the countervailing interests that can and
do justify closure, sealing and other permissible avenues of secrecy.
In many situations, the prosecutor will conclude and argue for
complete closure, even including, at times, the deferral of notice
and docketing until the compelling countervailing interests can be
adequately safeguarded.
Now, to be sure, several Second Circuit decisions 7 and United
States Supreme Court decisions 18 suggest that such extensive
closure measures should be very rare. It is precisely in cases of
international terrorism, however, that the necessarily high and
rigorous showing is very likely to be met, or most likely to be met.
As Judge Mukasey has stated, other special secrecy procedures
exist that do not just apply in terrorism cases, but typically do
come into play in terrorism cases. The Classified Information
Procedures Act and the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act are
sets of procedures designed to protect important national security
interests against such threats as international terrorism.' 9
Today, I have attempted to briefly describe the context of
international terrorism investigations and trials from a prosecutor's
perspective. It is a perspective, I recognize, that is viewed by many
16 Section 50.9 of the Federal Register, for example, seeks to safeguard our
valuable First Amendment protections. 28 C.F.R. § 50.9 (2000). It instructs
government attorneys to "ordinarily oppose closure" of the courtroom. Id. It also
makes clear that the government must petition for closure "only when [it] is
plainly essential to the interests of justice." Id.
"7 See, e.g., Bobb v. Senkowski, 196 F.3d 350, 353 (2d Cir. 1999) (holding
that in order for a state to justify courtroom closure for the duration of an
undercover officer's testimony, it must demonstrate that such a measure is
necessary to protect the identity and safety of the officer); Glaude v. Artuz, 189
F.3d 460 (2d Cir.1999), cert. denied sub nor. Dones v. Johnson, 120 S. Ct. 1428
(2000) (mem.) (scrutinizing the prosecution's proffered interests in sealing the
courtroom during an undercover officer's testimony).
18 See, e.g., Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 47 n.6 (1984) (noting that
extensive pre-trial publicity is often cause for courtroom closure).
19 Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1811 (1994 &
Supp. IV 1998); Classified Information Procedures Act, 18 U.S.C. app. §§ 1-16
(1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
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in the media and others as too secretive, and too closed to engender
the public's confidence that the criminal justice system is always
working as fairly as it should be in cases involving international
terrorism.
Prosecutors and judges must be sensitive to the media and the
public's right of access to the judiciary in international terrorism
cases. Particular care does need to be taken to observe the
procedural safeguards of access so that the media and the public
are given notice when they are entitled to it, and can press for
greater openness and more disclosure.
At the same time, however, what we would ask is that the
media and the public recognize, and even try to accept, that the law
protects and needs to protect the compelling countervailing interests
that are so frequently present in international terrorism cases:
national security; public safety; ongoing investigations; often
involving ongoing terrorist plots; and witness safety. Very often, in
terrorism cases, the law will strike a balance in favor of greater
closure, sealing and secrecy. This may at times frustrate the media.
But that, in my view, is a necessary and lawful price to pay.
Adam Liptak*
"The history of liberty," Justice Frankfurter wrote, "has largely
been the history of the observance of procedural safeguards."' The
rights guaranteed by the First Amendment 2 are, in theory, at least,
protected in no small part by elaborate procedural safeguards.' In
the area of the First Amendment rights of the press and public for
access to criminal proceedings, the Supreme Court and the Second
Circuit have set out clear and detailed procedural requirements.4
These procedural rules have been insufficiently enforced in New
York's federal courts in recent proceedings involving allegations of
international terrorism.
As a substantive matter, the press and public have a presump-
tive right of access to criminal proceedings.5 Such proceedings
may be closed to the press and public without violating the First
Amendment only when three exacting requirements have been met.
First, closure must serve a compelling interest. Second, there must
be a substantial probability such that in the absence of closure, the
compelling interest would be harmed. Lastly, it must be the case
that there are no alternatives to closure that would adequately
Senior Counsel, The New York Times Co.
McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 347 (1943).
2 U.S. CONST. amend. I. In relevant part, the First Amendment commands
that "Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom.., of the press."
Id.
3 See, e.g., Henry P. Monaghan, First Amendment "Due Process, " 83 HARV.
L. REv. 518, 518 (1970) (explaining that courts have realized the important role
of procedure in protecting freedom of speech and have "begun to construct a
body of procedural law which defines the manner in which they ... evaluate and
resolve first amendment claims").
4 See, e.g., Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 609 n.25
(1982); United States v. Cojab, 996 F.2d 1404, 1408 (2d. Cir. 1993); In re
Herald Co., 734 F.2d 93, 102 (2d Cir. 1984).
' Press-Enterprise v. Superior Court, 478 U.S. 1, 11 (1986) [hereinafter
Press-Enterprise II]; Press-Enterprise v. Superior Court, 464 U.S. 501, 505
(1984) [hereinafter Press-Enterprise I]; Globe Newspaper, 457 U.S. at 605;
Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 580 (1980).
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protect that compelling interest.6 In other words, "[w]here the State
attempts to deny the right of access [to the courtroom and legal
papers] in order to inhibit the disclosure of sensitive information,"
the Supreme Court requires that such denial be "necessitated by a
compelling government interest ... narrowly tailored to serve that
interest."7
These standards are presumptive; they are not absolute. As a
result, decisions on whether proceedings are to be open or closed
are the subject matter of litigation. Access litigation is unusual in
at least two ways: (i) the opponent of closure is often not a party
to the proceeding and thus uninformed; and (ii) open argument on
the question of closure might itself disclose what arguably ought
to be kept secret. Without appropriate procedural rules to address
these anomalies, the substantive access right could seldom be
vindicated. At the other extreme, the interests requiring secrecy
could never be protected. As the Supreme Court stated in Globe
Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, "for a case-by-case approach to
be meaningful, representatives of the press and general public must
be given an opportunity to be heard on the question of their
exclusion." 8 Trial courts, however, must have discretion to
safeguard the matters sought to be closed. Otherwise, the interest
at issue "would be defeated before it could ever be brought to
bear."9
The Supreme Court and the Second Circuit have fashioned
three basic procedural requirements to address these issues. In order
to properly safeguard the First Amendment interests of both the
press and public at large, these procedural mandates must be
rigorously adhered to.
6 Press-Enterprise II, 478 U.S. at 14; Press-Enterprise I, 464 U.S. at 510;
Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 581.
7 Globe Newspaper, 457 U.S. at 607.
8 Id. at 609 n.25 (quoting Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 401
(1979) (Powell, J., concurring)). The full sentence from Justice Powell's
concurrence reads as follows: "If the constitutional right of the press and public
to access is to have substance, representatives of these groups must be given an
opportunity to be heard on the question of their exclusion." Gannett, 443 U.S.
at 401.
9 Globe Newspaper, 457 U.S. at 609 n.25.
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I. PROCEDURAL REQUIREMENTS
A. Notice
Notice to the press and public is one necessary requirement that
must be met in order for a proceeding to be kept secret. The
Supreme Court has not considered the form such notice must take
beyond some remarks by Justice Powell in his concurrence in
Gannett Co. v. DePasquale1 ° Justice Powell would not require
notice to anyone except those present in the courtroom at the time
the motion for closure is made.11 It apparently did not occur to
him - as is relatively common practice in the Southern District of
New York - that the closure motion itself could be made in a
closed courtroom proceeding in which the very docket sheet is
sealed. Justice Powell reasoned that "the alternative would require
substantial delays in trial and pretrial proceedings while notice was
given to the public."12
The Second Circuit requires more. Recognizing that "it seems
entirely inadequate to leave the vindication of a First Amendment
right to the fortuitous presence in the courtroom of a public-spirited
citizen willing to complain about closure," it held that "[s]ome
form of public notice should be given, since it is important,
perhaps especially so, to afford an opportunity to challenge
courtroom closure accomplished in the absence of spectators."13
Prompt docketing of the closure motion, papers supporting and
opposing the motion, the time and place of the resulting hearing,
the occurrence of the hearing, the disposition of the motion and the
fact of courtroom closure are all required, "normally on the day the
pertinent event occurs.,
14
'0 443 U.S. at 401.
" Id. (opining that the opportunity to be heard "extends no farther than the
persons actually presented at the time the motion for closure is made").
12 id.
13 In re Herald Co., 734 F.2d 93, 102 (2d Cir. 1984).
14 Id.; see also United States v. Cojab, 996 F.2d 1404, 1408 (2d Cir. 1993)
(holding that the order of the district court sealing the hearing room records must
be vacated where the order was decided in the judge's robing room and the
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Such notice through docket entries represents a minimum.
There is nothing wrong with doing more, "such as notification to
one of the news media, or perhaps to one attorney in those areas
where substantial agreement can be achieved as to the appropriate
recipient of such notice."'" Another simple option not noted by
the Second Circuit is the posting of notices of closure motions in
the courthouse press room. All of these procedures work smoothly
in other jurisdictions. 16
The Second Circuit, however, does note two caveats. Echoing
Justice Powell, it recognizes that "notice requirements must remain
sufficiently flexible to accommodate the exigencies of the litigation
process and avoid unwarranted delays."' 7 It also takes account of
"extraordinary situations where even the contemporaneous notation
in the docket that courtroom closure has been sought or has
occurred could create a substantial risk of harm to an individu-
al."'18 Even here, the trial court may order a delay of docketing for
only "some brief interval, provided that the interval ends upon a
specified date or the occurrence, within a reasonable time, of a
specified event and that the judge's reasons for delaying docketing
are set forth, under seal if appropriate, for eventual appellate
scrutiny."' 9 This unusual procedure must only be used where the
threat to an individual's safety is a significant risk beyond the risk
notice that the hearing would be closed and its records sealed was not docketed
until a month after the hearing).
"5 In re Herald, 734 F.2d at 103.
16 See, e.g., In re Knight Publ'g Co., 743 F.2d 231, 234 (4th Cir. 1984)
(requiring that "when the district court has been made aware of the desire of
specific members of the public to be present, reasonable steps to afford them an
opportunity to submit their views should be taken before closure"); Miami Herald
Publ'g Co. v. Lewis, 426 So. 2d 1, 8 (Fla. 1982) (holding that notice must be
given to at least one member of the local media).
17 In re Herald, 734 F.2d at 102.
18 Id. at 102 n.7. The sole example offered is the docketing of a closure
order on the eve of a multi-defendant trial that "might indicate that one defendant
had been granted immunity in camera in anticipation of his testifying against the
other defendants, an inference that could endanger the witness." Id.
19 Id.
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arising from the publication of information in newspaper articles
that has already occurred.2 °
B. Public Hearings and Findings of Fact
The second procedural requirement is a public hearing. 2' The
case law suggests that oral argument is required prior to shutting
down access to the courtroom and relevant documents.22 Courts
in the Second Circuit, moreover, have vacated closure orders where
they were not made in open court.23 The third procedural require-
ment is the preparation of detailed findings of fact justifying such
closure as is determined to be necessary in order to allow meaning-
ful appellate review. 24 The Second Circuit has, on occasion,
vacated closure orders for insufficient specificity.25
A district court "may, where appropriate, put the contents of its
decision under seal," though "the fact that a sealing order has been
entered must be docketed., 26 The Second Circuit is thus relatively
casual in allowing the sealing of such judicial decisions. The
district courts of the Seventh Circuit, on the other hand, are subject
to much more rigorous requirements, as established by Judge
Easterbrook's statement in a chambers opinion:
20 Id. at 101 (emphasis added).
21 United States v. Haller, 837 F.2d 84, 87 (2d Cir. 1988).
22 See, e.g., United States v. Cojab, 996 F.2d 1404, 1408 (2d Cir. 1993)
(holding that a closure motion must be decided "in open court"); United States
v. Doe, 27 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1731, 1733 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (requiring a public
hearing including oral arguments).
23 Cojab, 996 F.2d at 1408 (holding that where an order sealing hearing
records is "not decided in open court . . . it must be vacated"); Doe, 27 Media
L. Rep. (BNA) at 1732-33 (stating that failure to follow the "extremely
important" procedural requirement of "public hearing on the closure motion"
requires vacatur remedied by subsequent briefing and oral argument).
24 Press-Enterprise II, 478 U.S. 1, 15 (1986) (holding that the First
Amendment right of access cannot be overcome by "conclusory assertion"); In
re Herald Co., 734 F.2d 93, 100 (2d Cir. 1984) (stating that the trial judge must
articulate a sufficiently detailed basis for any closure order).
25 See, e.g., In re The New York Times Co., 828 F.2d 110, 116 (2d Cir.
1987); Haller, 837 F.2d at 87.
26 Hailer, 837 F.2d at 87.
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What happens in the halls of government is presumptively
open to public scrutiny. Judges deliberate in private but
issue public decisions after public arguments based on
public records. The political branches of government claim
legitimacy by election, judges by reason. Any step that
withdraws an element of the judicial process from public
view makes the ensuing decision look more like fiat; this
requires rigorous justification. 7
A separate Seventh Circuit panel raised the same concern
regarding the specific question of sealing closure orders. Judge
Ripple, writing for the court, explained that
[a]lthough redaction of part of the explanation [for closure
or sealing] might be justified in some circumstances, the
use of such an awkward device ought to be invoked in
only the most unusual of situations. Sealing of the entire
explanation would indeed be an extraordinary step for a
district court to take, given the heavy burden it would
place on the Press and, indeed, on the appellate court in its
later evaluation of the appropriateness of such action.28
II. PROCEDURE IN NATIONAL SECURITY CASES
All three procedural requirements enumerated above must be
followed even, and perhaps especially, where the interest asserted
in favor of closure is national security or the safety of foreign
informants and American citizens. In In re Washington Post Co.,
the Fourth Circuit considered a plea agreement involving a Ghanian
citizen accused of espionage. 29 The defendant was alleged to have
obtained classified information concerning other Ghanians who
covertly worked for the Central Intelligence Agency, American
covert personnel in Ghana, and Ghanian dissident activity and
military aid from other nations to Ghana.3" As part of the plea
agreement, the defendant was to be exchanged for persons held in
27 In re Krynicki, 983 F.2d 74, 75 (7th Cir. 1992).
28 In re Associated Press, 162 F.3d 503, 510 (7th Cir. 1998) (footnote
omitted).
29 807 F.2d 383, 391 (4th Cir. 1986).
30 Id. at 386.
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Ghana on charges of spying on behalf of the United States. 31 The
parties jointly moved for closure of the plea hearing.32
The Fourth Circuit held that the three procedural requirements
outlined above were applicable:
We note further that, troubled as we are by the risk that
disclosure of classified information could endanger the
lives of both Americans and their foreign informants, we
are equally troubled by the notion that the judiciary should
abdicate its decision making responsibility to the executive
branch whenever national security concerns are present.
History teaches us how easily the spectre of a threat to
'national security' may be used to justify a wide variety
of repressive government actions.
A blind acceptance by the courts of the government's
insistence on the need for secrecy, without notice to others,
without argument, and without a statement of reasons,
would impermissibly compromise the independence of the
judiciary and open the door to possible abuse. Accordingly,
we hold that the procedural requirements ... are fully
applicable in the context of closure motions based on
threats to national security.33
Although the public and the press presumptively "enjoy a free
right of access to criminal proceedings," this right "is not absolute
and in certain circumstances it may give way to other important
rights or interests."' The Doe cases, described below, illustrate
the difficulties that New York's federal courts have encountered in
applying the detailed procedural requirements set out by the Su-
31 id.
32 Id.
13 Id. at 391-92; accord United States v. Doe, 27 Media L. Rep. (BNA)
1731, 1733 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (stating that the court agrees "with the Times that
these procedural requirements are mandated and remain extremely important
where the interest advanced as the basis for closure involve questions of national
security").
3 Doe, 27 Media L. Rep. (BNA) at 1732 (citing Press-Enterprise II, 478
U.S. 1, 1 (1986)).
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preme Court and the Second Circuit for reviewing a challenge to
a sealing order in a criminal terrorism proceeding.35
A. Doe I
On September 11, 1998, a closed criminal proceeding, cap-
tioned United States v. Doe (Doe 1),36 was held before Magistrate
Judge Andrew J. Peck in the Southern District of New York. The
next day, The New York Times reported:
Federal authorities in Manhattan charged another suspect
yesterday in a continuing investigation into terrorism in the
wake of the bombings last month of the United States
embassies in Kenya and Tanzania.
The suspect, whose identity was not disclosed, was taken
before a Federal magistrate judge in Manhattan late in the
afternoon for a closed court proceeding. Reporters and
other were asked to leave the courtroom, and the magis-
trate, Andrew J. Peck, said afterward that the record would
remain sealed.
Magistrate Peck refused to explain why he had sealed the
case, and it was not clear who had sought the secrecy,
whether either the prosecution or the defense objected, or
what the charges were.37
On October 30, 1998, in a long front-page article, The Times
reported that the suspect's name was Ali A. Mohamed.38 The
article described Mr. Mohamed's varied efforts on behalf of and in
opposition to the United States.39
35 id.
36 98 Mag. 2332 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 15, 1999) [hereinafter Doe 1] (on file with
the Journal of Law and Policy).
37 Benjamin Weiser, In Manhattan, Third Suspect Is Held in Embassy
Bombings, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 12, 1998, at D12.
38 Benjamin Weiser, U.S. Ex-Sergeant Linked to bin Laden Conspiracy, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 30, 1998, at Al.
39 Id. The article describes Ali A. Mohamed as an honorably discharged
Army sergeant who handled clerical work and instructed soldiers about Islamic
culture. Mr. Mohamed, a native of Egypt, was well versed in four languages and
had served as an officer in Egypt for thirteen years prior to coming to the United
States in 1985. Mr. Mohamed's description as a good citizen was undermined by
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A few days later, The Times wrote to Magistrate Peck about the
action against Mr. Mohamed. The Times noted that "every aspect
of the proceeding has been sealed" and asked for the docket
number, docket sheet, sealing order and other materials "ordinarily
available even in cases warranting substantial secrecy. ' 4 By order
dated November 13, 1998, Magistrate Judge Peck provided the
caption (albeit a "John Doe" caption) and docket number, but
nothing more.4' He wrote: "If the Times (or any other news
organization) seeks to challenge the sealing order(s) in 98 Mag.
2332, it should proceed by formal motion before me (or the Part I
District Judge)., 42 Thus, two months passed before the press and
public were able to obtain the title and docket number of the
action. The docket itself remained sealed.
On December 4, 1998, The Times moved to unseal the
proceedings. With the consent of both parties, Judge Shira A.
Scheindlin (the Part I district court judge) promptly ordered the
clerk of the court to disclose the docket and "to ensure that the
docket reflects the existence of any sealed proceedings, sealed
orders or other sealed filings in this case, without revealing the
names of any parties, other than the United States. 43 Thus, three
months passed before the press and public were able to inspect
accusations that he traveled from his station at Fort Bragg, North Carolina to
New York in 1989 to train Islamic militants to fight against the Soviet Union in
Afghanistan. Because Mr. bin Laden's associates, particularly those terrorists
accused of bombing American embassies in East Africa, were notorious for
fighting in the Islamic holy war against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan, the
claim was that Mr. Mohamed linked himself to bin Laden's dangerous terrorist
network through his past military training in 1989 of these very same rebels, now
terrorists. Furthermore, a defendant among those charged in 1995 with plotting
to blow up New York's landmarks claimed that Mr. Mohamed was instead part
of a covert American operation to train and arm Afghan rebels fighting the
Soviet Union. Id.
40 Letter from Mr. Adam Liptak, Senior Counsel, The New York Times Co.,
to Magistrate Judge Andrew J. Peck of the Southern District of New York (Nov.
3, 1998) (on file with the Journal of Law and Policy).
4" Doe I, 98 Mag. 2332 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 13, 1998) (on file with the Journal
of Law and Policy).
42 Id.
4' Doe 1, 98 Mag. 2332 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 9, 1998) (on file with the Journal
of Law and Policy).
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even the docket sheet in a criminal proceeding concerning issues
of grave public importance.
The public notice requirement is meant to be, and by its nature
must be, self-executing. Yet only because The Times happened to
learn of the closed proceeding and chose to pursue the matter did
the docket become publicly available. It is, of course, theoretically
required to be open from the start. One cannot know how many
other similar proceedings have been heard or are being heard in
total secrecy.
On January, 15, 1999, Judge Scheindlin issued an oral order.
She framed the procedural issues this way:
The Times first argues that procedural irregularities in the
original sealing order justify its vacatur. In particular, it
argues that because the docket sheet in this case remained
sealed for approximately three months, a problem which
the government attributes, in part, to clerical error, there
was inadequate public notice of closure; and it argues that
there was a lack of public hearing on the closure motion.
In addition, being unable to review the sealing order,
which itself is under seal, The Times questions whether the
order contains detailed findings of fact that would be
sufficient to allow review by a superior court.44
Judge Scheindlin vacated the original sealing order and then
simultaneously reimposed it. She concluded:
Due to the procedural defects, I vacate the original order
placing these proceedings under seal. Given my determina-
tion, however, that there are compelling interests justifying
closure of this case at this time, I find that these violations
do not require the unsealing of this proceeding, and I
therefore simultaneously reimpose a new order sealing all
proceedings and filings in this case with a few exceptions
The public has now been provided with adequate notice of
the existence of the sealed proceedings, and The Times has
"United States v. Doe, 27 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1731, 1732 (S.D.N.Y.
1999) (citation omitted).
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been given the opportunity before this court to challenge
the closure through briefing and oral argument.45
As a substantive matter, Judge Scheindlin went on to opine that the
asserted interests sufficient to justify closure posed "a significant
probability of harm to compelling interests, including the preserva-
tion of grand jury secrecy, the government's interest in pursuing
ongoing criminal investigations and the safety of sources related to
such investigations." 46
Subsequently, Judge Scheindlin unsealed nine documents
relating to the litigation of the access motion, none of which
contained any substantive information. Judge Scheindlin, however,
undertook an ongoing role for the court in an attempt to protect the
First Amendment rights of both the press and public. As a result,
Judge Scheindlin ordered that "the government and the defendant
submit all future sealed filings in this case for in camera review
and determination as to whether they should remain sealed. 47
On the available information, there is little to quarrel with in
Judge Scheindlin's decision except, perhaps, with her coyness about
the identity of the defendant. The government, in a public brief
supplemented by a sealed affirmation (which would seem to be the
appropriate procedure),48 argued that "judicial confirmation of
41 Id. at 1733.
46 Id.
47 Id. The court ultimately released a number of the documents The Times
had sought. See Benjamin Weiser, Indicated Ex-Sergeant Says He Knows Who
Bombed U.S. Embassies, N.Y. TIMES, June 5, 1999, at A3 (reflecting information
from documents unsealed following indictment of Ali A. Mohamed); Benjamin
Weiser, U.S. Charges Ex-Soldier, Calling Him a Plotter with bin Laden, N.Y.
TIMES, May 20, 1999, at A12 (describing information revealed in conjunction
with the indictment of Ali A. Mohamed).
48 See In re Krynicki, 983 F.2d 74, 76 (7th Cir. 1992).
Public argument is the norm even, perhaps especially, when the case
is about the right to suppress publication of information. Briefs in the
Pentagon Papers case, The New York Times Co. v. United States, 403
U.S. 713 (1971), and the hydrogen bomb plans case, United States v.
Progressive, Inc., 467 F. Supp. 990 (W.D. Wis. 1979), were available
to the press, although sealed appendices discussed in detail the
documents for which protection was sought.
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[Mr. Mohamed's identity] would convert the anonymous whisper
into hard information. ' 49 There may well be cases in which
judicial conformation of a newspaper's reporting could do separate
harm to the national security, people's safety or other interests. It
is hard to imagine, though, the terrorist, spy or co-defendant who
awaits judicial confirmation of a defendant's identity before taking
action, where the defendant has been identified by name in detailed
front-page news reporting in The Times.
B. Doe 11
On January 3, 2000, a closed proceeding, captioned United
States v. Doe (Doe II), was held before Magistrate Judge Michael
H. Dolinger of the Southern District of New York.5° The New
York Times reported:
Two Algerians, one in Brooklyn and the other in Seattle,
have been arrested in the continuing investigation of a
terrorist bomb plot. The new arrests came amid indications
that federal authorities are focusing their efforts on a
network of Algerians in New York, Seattle and Boston,
officials said yesterday.
The Brooklyn man, Abdelwaheb Hamdouche, was taken
into custody Saturday night at Kennedy International
Airport as he was preparing to leave for Paris on a KLM
flight, officials said. Mr. Hamdouche, 34, a naturalized
French citizen, was held as a material witness in the bomb
plot investigation, and it is believed that he was ordered to
remain in custody after a closed hearing yesterday in
Federal District Court in Manhattan. ...
After yesterday's closed hearing, neither a federal prosecu-
tor, David N. Kelley, nor Mr. Hamdouche's lawyer,
Mitchell A. Golub, would comment or even describe the
proceeding.
4' Brief for the United States of America at 12, Doe 1, 98 Mag. 2332
(S.D.N.Y. Jan. 13, 1999) (on file with the Journal of Law and Policy).
50 2000 Mag. 3 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 25, 2000) [hereinafter Doe II] (on file with
the Journal of Law and Policy).
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A federal magistrate judge, Michael H. Dolinger, refused
a request by The New York Times to open the session, and
afterward, he would not say why he had conducted it in
secret.... No one would say if Mr. Hamdouche had been
ordered held, but he did not leave the courtroom with his
defense lawyer as the hearing ended.5
Four days later, The Times wrote to Magistrate Judge Dolinger
seeking "compliance with the procedural requirements mandated by
a series of Second Circuit decisions concerning the First Amend-
ment access rights of the press and public to criminal proceedings:
notice (in the form of docketing), an opportunity to be heard and
factual findings justifying any closure. 5 2 Three days after that,
Magistrate Judge Dolinger issued an order in response, stating that:
"[i]f The New York Times wishes to seek an unsealing order, it
may do so by service and filing of a formal motion. 5 3 Magistrate
Judge Dolinger declined to unseal the docket on the strength of a
letter application. Instead, he insisted on compliance with procedur-
al niceties even as he declined to comply with procedural require-
ments mandated by the First Amendment.
On January 13, 2000, The Times, the Daily News, and Newsday
made a formal motion for access. In Doe I, the parties had filed
only portions of their opposition papers under seal. In Doe II, all
opposition papers were filed entirely under seal, and the judge
declined the newspapers' request for redacted versions. On this
point, the court ruled:
We have also considered the request of movants for access
to a sanitized version of the opposition papers filed by the
parties to the sealed proceeding. We have declined to
direct those parties to undertake such an editing job since
it is difficult to see how the papers can be redacted to
eliminate all confidential information while still preserving
5' Benjamin Weiser, Two New Arrests in Investigation of Bomb Plot, N.Y.
TIMEs, Jan. 4, 2000, at B 1.
52 Letter from Mr. Adam Liptak, Senior Counsel, The New York Times Co.,
to Magistrate Judge Michael H. Dolinger of the Southern District of New York
(Jan. 7, 2000) (on file with the Journal of Law and Policy).
" Id. Magistrate Judge Michael H. Dolinger issued an endorsed order, which
was hand written upon the Times' letter application to him.
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enough coherence to make the documents a useful tool for
movants. In any event, we are aware of the movants' legal
position through their initial submission and can assess the
merits of both sides' contentions without further brief-
ing.54
This ruling tests the premises of the adversary system. The
newspapers sought only an abstract statement of the interests
asserted in favor of closure. Judge Scheindlin had informed The
Times of the interests at stake in Doe L It is at least conceivable
that, on learning of the asserted interest, the newspapers could have
directed the court to a body of law on any given point that the
parties had failed to discuss and that the court had overlooked. The
court also declined to hear oral argument.5
The Fourth Circuit has recognized that objections to closure in
national security cases "will necessarily be abstract and unin-
formed., 56 "But their abstraction," the court correctly concluded,
"will hardly render them valueless."57 The Fourth Circuit candidly
recognizes that "[e]ven abstract arguments will serve to remind the
court of the importance of the interests that must be weighed
against the government's interest in secrecy., 58 The Doe H court
issued sealed and open versions of its decision. Before issuing the
latter, it allowed the parties to inspect it and to propose further
redactions. The parties apparently made no suggestions for further
redaction, and certainly nothing of substance was revealed.
Even the discussion of the procedural lapses noted by the
newspapers was largely relegated to the sealed decision. The court,
for example, wrote:
For reasons noted at some length in the sealed decision, we
conclude that the procedures initially followed to decide
whether to seal the case were permissible and in any event
provide no basis for an unsealing order at this stage,
" Doe II, 2000 Mag. 3 at 6 n.3 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 25, 2000) (on file with the
Journal of Law and Policy).
" Id. at 2 n.2.
56 In re Washington Post Co., 807 F.2d 383, 391 n.7 (4th Cir. 1986).
57 id.
58 id.
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particularly in view of the movants' current opportunity to
address the substantive issues on their motion.59
The court credited only one of the newspaper's procedural
arguments, conceding "that the failure to create a docket sheet for
this matter, which is attributable to an apparent clerical error,
should be corrected."'  In this regard, the court admitted the
following:
To remedy this situation, we now directed the Clerk of the
Court to redesignate this proceeding as a Miscellaneous
matter with an appropriate docket number, and ensure that
a docket sheet is created and publicly filed. In this manner,
movants and other members of the public may learn of
events that take place in this proceeding, whether court
hearings or the filings of documents, and even if these
matters are initially sealed, members of the public may
take appropriate action to gain access to them.61
About two months passed between the closed hearing and the
opening of the docket. It is virtually certain that even this minor
step would not have been taken but for the litigation by the
newspapers. The litigation itself could hardly have been less
satisfying: the newspaper movants to this day have no inkling of
the reasons proffered for closure and have had no opportunity to
formulate responsive arguments. No hearing was ever had. Even
the name of the subject of the proceeding, disclosed in the initial
New York Times article and confirmed in a Daily News article
reporting on Magistrate Judge Dolinger's decision,62 remains
secret.
'9 Doe II, 2000 Mag. 3 at 4 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 25, 2000) (on file with the
Journal of Law and Policy).
60 Id. Recall that the discussions in Doe also blamed the clerk's office.
United States v. Doe, 27 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1731, 1732 (S.D.N.Y. 1999)
(observing that "the docket sheet in the case remained sealed for approximately
three months, a problem which the government attributes, in part, to clerical
error").
61 Doe II, 2000 Mag. 3 at 5 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 25, 2000) (on file with the
Journal of Law and Policy).
62 Greg B. Smith, Judge Won't Unseal Terrorist-Plot Case, DAILY NEWS,
Feb. 29, 2000, at 6.
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The central problem with the two Doe cases does not lie in
their results, which may have been correct. The problem is that it
took months of litigation to enforce procedural requirements that
are meant to be self-executing. The rights at stake are those of the
public. And the public should not have to rely on a newspaper's
decision to allocate resources to the vindication of the public's
rights. The responsibility for the enforcement of the public's
procedural rights is lodged with the judiciary itself, and, to some
extent, with federal prosecutors. They have an institutional interest
in maintaining an open system. Both Doe I and Doe H, and many
similar cases, serve to underscore the importance of strictly
adhering to court crafted procedural safeguards. Whatever the
eventual results in these cases, the system failed in allowing these
procedural rights to be ignored for months at a time.
Based on the lapses in these cases, the public cannot have
complete confidence in the criminal justice system as it confronts
cases involving international terrorism. "People in an open society
do not demand infallibility from their institutions," Chief Justice
Burger wrote twenty years ago, "but it is difficult for them to
accept what they are prohibited from observing. ' '63
63 Richmond Newspaper, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 572 (1980).
Gerald L. Shargel*
I think a defendant rarely desires secrecy in criminal proceed-
ings. First, I think it is very difficult to obtain secrecy. The only
case I can remember where there was meaningful secrecy, and this
is apart from a question of cooperators, was when John Gotti, Sr.
was indicted in 1990' and a bail hearing was set before Judge
Glasser. The concern was that the government wanted to play the
Title III eavesdropping tapes2 at the bail hearing. This occurred
during the pre-O.J. Simpson days, when the press attention to the
Gotti case was unprecedented. The concern was that the disclosure
of the Title III tapes to the press, and the reporting of that material,
would certainly pollute the defendant's right to a fair trial.
In order to avoid this potential bias, we made a motion for
closure of the bail hearings. There was some precedent for closure
of suppression hearings.3 But, at that time there was no precedent
for closure of a bail hearing. Judge Glasser, however, decided that
closure was required. In considering closure, Judge Glasser applied
* Adjunct Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School.
See Selwyn Raab, Gotti and 3 Top Aides Arrested on Federal Racketeering
Charges, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 12, 1990, at Al.
2 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998). Title III of the Omnibus
Crime Control and Safe Streets Act, which authorizes use of electronic
surveillance for specified classes of crimes, represents a comprehensive attempt
by Congress to promote more effective control of crime while protecting the
privacy of individual thought and expression. Its purpose is "to prohibit, on pain
of criminal and civil penalties, all interceptions of oral and wire communications
except those specifically provided for in the Act, most notably those interceptions
permitted to law enforcement officers when authorized by court order in
connection with investigation of serious crimes listed in 18 U.S.C. § 2516." Id.
§ 2510(i)(4). See also United States v. Giordano, 416 U.S. 505, 514 (1974)
(discussing the purpose of Title III).
' See, e.g., Johnson Newspaper Corp. v. Hon. Glenn R. Morton, 862 F.2d
25, 29-30 (2d Cir. 1988) (explaining that the trial court's decision to close the
courtroom during suppression hearings in light of a "strong likelihood of
prejudice to the right of fair trial" in the absence of closure was appropriate
under the circumstances).
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the procedural rules the Supreme Court had set forth in cases like
Waller v. Georgia4 and Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court of
California,5 and came out on the defense's side by ruling that the
proceeding would be closed. In some rare cases the defense wants
closure and will actually obtain it. Where the press is not present
in the courtroom, who will protect the interests of the fourth estate?
The answer seems to be the United States Attorney's Office. The
Justice Department has a policy providing that, where a defense
lawyer makes a motion for closure in a criminal case, the United
States Attorney or the Assistant United States Attorney will
vigorously oppose that motion, because the policy of the Justice
Department is to insure open proceedings.6
In the case of a cooperator, the situation is different. Obviously,
the lawyer representing the cooperator and the government lawyer
both have a common interest in assuring that the proceedings be
made public. Often, guilty pleas are entered upon a sealed
transcript that is not released to the public for several weeks or
perhaps several months after the fact. In such a case, it is true that
4 467 U.S. 39 (1984). In Waller, the Supreme Court set forth a four-factor
test that courts must use to determine whether closure of the courtroom is
necessary: (1) "the party seeking to close the hearing must advance an overriding
interest that is likely to be prejudiced;" (2) "the closure must be no broader than
necessary to protect the interest;" (3) "the trial court must consider reasonable
alternatives to closing the proceeding;" and (4) the trial court "must make
findings adequate to support the closure." Id. at 48.
' 478 U.S. 1 (1986) (holding that the qualified First Amendment right of
public access, which generally attaches to preliminary hearings, can nonetheless
be countermanded by specific, on-the-record findings demonstrating that there is
a substantial probability that the accused's right to a fair trial will be prejudiced
by publicity, that closure would prevent these dangers, and that reasonable
alternatives to closure cannot adequately protect the accused's fair trial rights).
6 The United States Department of Justice has stated that the mission of the
Office of Information and Privacy is to "manage and coordinate the discharge of
the Department of Justice's responsibilities under the Freedom of Information
Act (FOIA) ... within all Federal agencies and compliance with the Privacy Act
within the Department of Justice." UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,
THE OFFICE OF INFORMATION AND PRIVACY, available at ht-
tp://www.usdoj.gov/jmd/mps/mission.htm; see also Freedom of Information Act,
5 U.S.C. § 552 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998) (requiring that government agencies
make information available to the public).
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the press does not have an opportunity to invade the process. As a
result, only in rare occasions will anyone be aware of the status of
a particular case. Sometimes guilty pleas are literally entered into
under the secrecy of night. For example, when Sammy "the Bull"
Gravano7 entered his guilty plea, it was actually a night session in
the Eastern District of New York when everyone but the mainte-
nance staff had exited in the building. Thus, in situations where the
defense and the prosecutor argue for closure, it is very difficult for
the press to relate that decision to the general public.
In addition, from a practical perspective, in cases where both
the prosecution and the defense want closure for any number of
reasons - matters disclosed at a sidebar that might influence the
jury if it appears in the press, or concerns about third parties who
are not part of the process and not part of the trial but where both
sides want closure - a closed in-chambers proceeding or sidebar
proceeding is held that is not made available to the public. Often,
what happens is that a reporter in the courtroom will stand up and
object to the closure as the parties are retreating to the chambers
or the robing room. I can tell you that, even though some of our
courthouse reporters are quite eloquent, they do not get very far.
That is, there is no Waller analysis at that point.8 I guess the
danger from the perspective of the press is that they represent the
lone voice of objection. As a result, it is very difficult for the press
to win a motion objecting to closure.
Another area where closure is common is terrorism. Similar to
the Supreme Court noting that death is different, terrorism is
' Salvatore Gravano, a.k.a. Sammy "the Bull," is a mafia informant and
admitted hired killer who has testified in numerous mafia cases. See Greg B.
Smith, Sammy Banks on Feds: Gravano Expecting a Rescue, DAILY NEWS, Mar.
7, 2000, at 8.
8 Waller, 467 U.S. at 46 (noting that a public trial is beneficial to the
defendant). In Waller, the Court explains that "the explicit Sixth Amendment
right of the accused is no less protective of a public trial than the implicit First
Amendment right of the press and public." Id. The Court's analysis, however,
does not go further than to quote from In re Oliver, which holds that "the
presence of interested spectators may keep his triers keenly alive to a sense of
their responsibility and to the importance of their functions." Id. (citing In re
Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 270 n.25 (1948)).
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different. 9 Different rules apply for different reasons in terrorism
cases, but mostly for practical necessity.1" The courts, thus, will
continue to look at terrorism in a different light.
In situations that are more easily recognized by litigants, such
as criminal cases, an undercover police officer still active in the
vicinity in which he made the arrest does not want to testify in an
open courtroom. Some fairly recent litigation in the Eastern and
Southern Districts of New York has resulted in closure in such
cases." One of the key questions that courts entertain is whether
less restrictive means can achieve closure, i.e., should the judge sua
sponte allow the placement of a screen in front of the witness or
allow the witness to testify in a disguise? What defense lawyer on
this earth would want a witness testifying against his or her client
with a screen in front or a disguise? I do not believe this is a
sensible procedure as it does not promote the idea of a fair trial.
Unfortunately, the recent case law permits such means of clo-
sure. 12
Judge Nickerson once granted habeas relief where family
members of the defendant on trial were excluded, and where there
was an insufficient finding that the witness was concerned about
9 Murray v. Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1, 9 (1989) (citing Ford v. Wainwright,
477 U.S. 399, 411 (1986)).
'0 The Supreme Court has unequivocally rejected the "suggestion that the
principles [governing procedural fault] ... apply differently depending on the
nature of the penalty a State imposes for the violation of its criminal laws" and
similarly discarded the idea that "there is anything fundamentally unfair about
enforcing procedural default rules." Murray, 492 U.S. at 9.
" See, e.g., Pastrana v. Senkowski, No. CV 97-5158, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
18513, at *27 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 1, 1999) (denying the petition for habeas corpus
relief); Dones v. Johnson, No. 96 Civ. 7291, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22263, at
*16 (S.D.N.Y. June 30, 1998) (denying the petition for habeas corpus relief
because the partial closure of the trial during the testimony of an undercover
police officer involved in ongoing narcotics cases in the vicinity of the trial was
not a violation of the petitioner's Sixth Amendment right to a public trial).
12 In Pastrana, for example, an application for habeas corpus relief was
denied because petitioner could not show that the state court's rejection of his
claims for closure of the trial for an undercover officer's testimony, and a
promptly stricken reference by a witness to uncharged crimes, was an unreason-
able application of Supreme Court precedent. Pastrana, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
18513, at *11; see also Dones, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22263, at *17.
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those particular family members.' 3 The witness basically stated
that he was "afraid to testify in front of the family of Defendant A,
but had no problem with testifying in front of the family of Defen-
dant B." The prosecutor retorted as follows: "Judge, there is no
way we can tell apart the families." The state court judge respond-
ed by excluding everyone from the courtroom. Judge Nickerson,
however, eventually granted habeas relief in that case.
From my perspective, however, as someone who is in the
trenches every day, I cannot state that secrecy in ordinary criminal
cases, including high profile criminal cases, always takes place. For
example, some applications for search warrants are made in secret
and obviously the applications or the supporting documents that are
offered to establish probable cause are kept secret, even after the
defendant is indicted. However, in a Rule 17(c) situation,1 4 where
there is a subpoena of documents or discovery including Title III
tapes, 5 which are not yet in the public domain, the court does not
ordinarily have secrecy concerns because in ordinary cases the
press is not as interested in the status of the case.
I do not believe that the walls of the Republic are crumbling
because of secrecy in ordinary criminal cases. When the Gotti, Sr.
case went to trial, several issues arose concerning the selection of
an anonymous jury.16 The issues were whether certain colloquy
13 United States v. Prince, No. CR 93-1073, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2962,
at *23 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 9, 1994).
14 FED. R. CRIM. P. 17(c). Rule 17(c) provides that:
A subpoena may also command the person to whom it is directed to
produce the books, papers, documents or other objects designated
therein. The court on motion made promptly may quash or modify the
subpoena if compliance would be unreasonable or oppressive. The
court may direct that books, papers, documents or objects designated
in the subpoena be produced before the court at a time prior to the trial
or prior to the time when they are to be offered in evidence and may
upon their production permit the books, papers, documents or objects
or portions thereof to be inspected by the parties and their attorneys.
Id.
15 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
16 See United States v. Gotti, 784 F. Supp. 1013 (E.D.N.Y. 1992); United
States v. Gotti, 753 F. Supp. 443 (E.D.N.Y. 1990). John Gotti, Sr. became boss
of the Gambino Crime Family after Paul Castellano, then head of the Gambino
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with prospective jurors should be kept under seal and whether
sidebar conferences should be kept under seal, at least for a period
of time. Judge Parker and Judge Glasser granted requests to keep
that information under seal.1 7 In the Gotti, Jr. case,18 tried before
Judge Parker in the Southern District of New York, similar issues
arose where Judge Parker sealed the record. 9 In that decision,
clan, was assassinated on a Manhattan street in December 1985. In 1986, an
indictment was filed charging Gotti and nine other defendants under the
Racketeer Influenced Corrupt Organizations Act ("RICO") with participating and
conspiring to participate in affairs of the Gambino crime family through a pattern
of racketeering activity. Gotti was also accused of the 1973 barroom murder of
James McBratney. Gotti, represented by attorney Bruce Cutler, was acquitted in
1987 of the charges by a not-guilty jury verdict. See John S. DeMott, The
"Dapper Don" Beats a Rap; Crime Boss John Gotti Is Acquitted of Racketeering
Charges, TIME, Mar. 23, 1987, at 18. Two years after his acquittal, Gotti was
arrested after leaving his favorite mob hangout in Little Italy, the Ravenite Social
Club. He was charged with assault and conspiracy for arranging, with a Hell's
Kitchen gang, a hit on John O'Connor, an official of a carpenter's union. Gotti
was acquitted of these charges in 1990. The "Teflon Don" returned to court that
same year when police burst into the Ravenite Social Club and arrested him. Yet
again, Gotti was accused of heading an organization involved in extortion, loan
sharking, obstruction of justice, robbery, gambling and tax evasion as well as
masterminding the hit on Paul Castellano in 1985. See Ed Magnuson, Still the
Teflon Don? John Gotti Sees "No Problem" Beating the Rap Yet Again, TIME,
Dec. 24, 1990, at 19. Gotti's right hand man, Salvatore "Sammy the Bull"
Gravano, turned government witness, giving key testimony about how the
assassination of Castellano was orchestrated by Gotti. In 1992, following a jury
trial in the Federal District Court, Eastern District of New York, Gotti was
sentenced to life in prison on murder and racketeering charges.
17 See, e.g., Gotti, 753 F. Supp. at 449 (granting closure in bail proceedings
where the defendants are "accused of participation in organized crime, the
pretrial publicity is intense, and the material to which the press seeks access is
extremely prejudicial").
"8 See United States v. Gotti, 42 F. Supp. 2d 252 (S.D.N.Y. 1999); United
States v. Gotti, 9 F. Supp. 2d 320 (S.D.N.Y. 1998).
19 See Gotti, 42 F. Supp. 2d at 259 (citing indictment on charges of
racketeering, conspiracy, extortion, wire fraud and extortion in telecommunica-
tions); Gotti, 9 F. Supp. 2d at 323 (citing indictment alleging that members of
the Gambino crime family engaged in extortion, illegal gambling, loan sharking,
money laundering, robbery and drug trafficking). Currently serving a life
sentence at the U.S. penitentiary in Marion, Illinois, John Gotti, Jr. reiterated his
guilty plea to charges of racketeering, extortion and tax evasion in a sentencing
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there was virtually no opposition to the sealing of the case, except
maybe that made by Greg Smith.20 However, he lost that case
again.21
The only other thing I wanted to mention about secrecy from
the perspective of someone who has gone to court in the Eastern
and Southern Districts of New York almost every day for thirty
years, is the security of the participants in the case. A federal court
house must provide a high level of security. District court judges,
moreover, are now advised not to travel with identifying vanity
plates on their motor vehicles.
We live in a free and open society, and as a result we do not
have secrecy in terms similar to mafia trials in Italy where judges
sometimes appear behind screens. Instead, in our society, which
was founded on the idea of openness and free access to the courts,
we have a level of existing security that exceeds that in most other
countries. Maybe the extent to which we endeavor to provide that
hearing in White Plains, N.Y. on September 3, 1999. Patrick Rogers et al., The
Family Way; Ill-suited for Life as a Crime Boss, John Gotti Follows His Father
into Federal Prison, PEOPLE, Sept. 27, 1999, at 79 [hereinafter The Family Way].
As head of the Gambino crime family, Gotti, Jr. had been accused of running a
telephone calling-card fraud and extorting construction companies. Gotti, Jr. was
also accused of extorting money from Scores, a topless Manhattan night club.
The scheme was said by prosecutors to have included parking attendants and
dancers paying kickbacks to mob bosses. Citing Threat, Judge Orders John Gotti
Jr. Held in Jail, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 3, 1998, at B5. Gotti, Jr. was originally
arrested on January 22, 1998 along with thirty-nine other alleged members of the
Gambino crime family, and charged with a number of racketeering charges. Id.
Under investigation by the FBI since 1994, Gotti, Jr.'s problems escalated when
investigators found large amounts of cash and illegal handguns, as well as a list
of Gambino members during a raid at his offices in Queens and the Bergin Hunt
and Fish Club. The Family Way, at 79. The evidence found in the raid led to
Gotti, Jr.'s original guilty plea in April 1999. Id.
20 Greg B. Smith, Junior's Brand-New Jam: Enforcer Implicates Gotti in
Extort Cases, DAILY NEWS, Apr. 3, 1998, at 7; see also William K. Rashbaum,
Scores Duo Gets 25 Years for Fraud, DAILY NEWS, Nov. 16, 1998, at 6
(explaining that two defendants pleaded guilty in connection with the Gotti case
in a sealed proceeding and entered the witness protection program).
2 United States v. Gotti, Jr., No. 99-1526, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 2739, at
*5 (2d Cir. Feb. 18, 2000) (affirming Gotti, Jr.'s conviction on two counts of
extortionate extension of credit).
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security is absolutely necessary. Whenever one enters a courthouse
these days, however, there are no friendly meetings. I am not
suggesting that there should not be security. To be clear, I am
suggesting that maybe more emphasis should be given to the actual
security system now being implemented. In terms of closure of
criminal proceedings, it is very difficult conceptually to understand
in a free and open society that this level of security is necessary.
Again, while this level of security may be necessary, it should be
implemented in a manner so as not to alienate all those who want
to visit our courthouses, whether because they want to watch the
proceedings in an open courtroom, or because they are parties to
litigation, or attorneys representing parties. I think we need to look
into what we can do about the public perception as to open access
to the courts. This will, ultimately, inure to the benefit of us all.
